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Abstract. Multi-resource fair allocation has been a hot topic of resource allocation.
Most recently, a dynamic dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism is proposed for
dynamic multi-resource fair allocation. In this paper, we prove that the competitive ratio
of the dynamic DRF mechanism is the reciprocal of the number of resource types, for
two different objectives. Moreover, we develop a linear-time algorithm to find a dynamic
DRF solution at each step.
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1 Introduction
With the ever-growing demand for cloud resources, multi-resource (such as CPUs, mem-
ory, and bandwidth) fair allocation became a fundamental problem in cloud computing
systems. The traditional slot-based scheduler for state-of-the-art cloud computing frame-
works (for example, Hapdoop) can lead to poor performance, unfairly punishing certain
workloads. Ghodsi et al. [2] proposed a compelling alternative known as the dominant
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resource fairness (DRF) mechanism, which is designed for Leontief preferences. DRF
is to maximize the minimum dominant share of users, where the dominant share is the
maximum share of any resource allocated to that user. DRF is generally applicable to
multi-resource environments where users have heterogeneous demands, and is now imple-
mented in the Hadoop Next Generation Fair Scheduler.
In recent years, DRF has attracted much attention and been generalized to many
dimensions. Joe-Wong et al. [7] designed a unifying multi-resource allocation framework
that captures the trade-offs between fairness and efficiency, which generalizes the DRF
measure. Gutman and Nisan [3] situated DRF in a common economics framework, ob-
taining a general economic perspective. Parkes et al. [5] extended DRF in several ways,
including the presence of zero demands and the case of indivisible tasks. Wang et al.
[6] generalized the DRF measure into the cloud computing systems with heterogeneous
servers. Most recently, Zarchy, Hay and Schapira [8] developed a framework for fair re-
source allocation that captures such implementation tradeoffs by allowing users to submit
multiple resource demands.
DRF uses complete information about the requirements of all agents in order to find
the fair solution. However, in reality, agents arrive over time, and we do not know the
requirements of forthcoming agents before allocating the resources to the arrived agents.
Recently, Kash, Procaccia and Shah [4] introduced a dynamic model of fair allocation and
proposed a dynamic DRF mechanism. They mentioned that a dynamic DRF solution can
be found by using water-filling algorithm or solving the corresponding linear program.
However, the running time of the water-filling algorithm is pseudo-polynomial in worst-
case scenario. Although solving a linear program can be done within polynomial time,
the running time is high. It is desired to design an efficient algorithm to find a dynamic
DRF solution.
In this paper, we further study the dynamic DRF mechanism. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic DRF mechanism. Section 3
gives the competitive ratios analysis of the dynamic DRF mechanism. Section 4 presents
a polynomial-time algorithm, which can find a dynamic DRF solution in O(k) time at
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every step k. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and gives the future work.
2 Dynamic Dominant Resource Fairness
Throughout this paper, assume that resources are divisible. In a multi-resource environ-
ment, there are n agents and m resources. Each agent i requires Dir-fraction of resource r
for each task, assuming that Dir > 0 for each resource r. As defined in [2], the dominant
resource of agent i is the resource r∗i such that Dir∗i = maxrDir, and Dir∗i is called its
dominant share. Following [4, 5], the normalized demand vector of agent i is given by
di = (di1, . . . , dim), where dir = Dir/Dir∗
i
for each resource r = 1, . . . , m. Clearly, dir ≤ 1
and dir∗
i
= 1 for each agent i.
In the dynamic resource allocation model considered in [4], agents arrive at different
times and do not depart. Assume that agent 1 arrives first, and in general agent k arrives
after agents 1, . . ., k − 1, for k ≥ 2. For convenience, we say that agent k arrives in step
k. An agent reports its demand which does not change over time when it arrives. Thus,
at step k, demand vectors d1, . . ., dk are known, and demand vectors dk+1, . . ., dn are
unknown. At each step k, a dynamic DRF mechanism produces an allocation Ak over
the agents present in the system, where Ak allocates Akir-fraction of resource r to agent
i, subject to the feasibility condition
n∑
i=1
Akir ≤ k/n, ∀r. (1)
Under the dynamic DRF mechanism, assume that allocations are irrevocable, i.e.,
Akir ≥ A
k−1
ir , for every step k ≥ 2, every agent i ≤ k − 1, and every resource r. At every
step k, assume Ak is non-wasteful, which means that for every agent i there exists y ∈ R+
such that for every resource r, Akir = y · dir. Let x
k
i be dominant share of user i at step k,
which implies
Akir = x
k
i · dir, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and r = 1, 2, . . . , m. (2)
At every step k, the dynamic DRF mechanism [4] starts from the current allocation among
the present agents 1, . . . , k and keeps allocating resources to agents that have the minimum
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dominant share synchronously, until a k/n fraction of at least one resource is allocated.
Formally, at every step k, the dominant share vector (xk1, . . . , x
k
k) of the dynamic DRF
allocation Ak can be obtained by solving the following linear program:


Maximize Mk
xki ≥M
k, ∀i ≤ k;
xki ≥ x
k−1
i , ∀i ≤ k − 1; (irrevocable)
k∑
i=1
dirx
k
i ≤ k/n, ∀r. (capacity constraints)
(3)
As shown in [4], the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies many desired properties. Espe-
cially, it satisfies sharing incentives (SI) and dynamic Pareto optimality (DPO). SI means
that, for all steps k and all agents i ≤ k, xki ≥ 1/n, i.e., when an agent arrives it receives
an allocation that it likes at least as much as an equal split of the resources. DPO means
that, for all steps k, there is a resource r such that
∑k
i=1 dirx
k
i = k/n, i.e., it should not
be possible to increase the allocation of an agent without decreasing the allocation of at
least another user, subject to not allocating more that k/n fraction of any resource.
3 Competitive ratios analysis
In [4], the authors analyzed the performance of the dynamic DRF mechanism on real
data, for two objectives: the sum of dominant shares (the maxsum objective) and the
minimum dominant share (the maxmin objective) of the agent present in the system. In
this section, we analyze the performance of the dynamic DRF mechanism in the worst-
case scenario. For a maximization problem, the competitive ratio ρ of an online algorithm
is the worst-case ratio between the cost of the solution found by the online algorithm and
the cost of an optimal solution in an offline setting where all the demands of agents are
known [1]. Clearly, ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, we define the competitive ratio of the dynamic
DRF mechanism as the worst-case ratio between the objective value of the dynamic DRF
solution (xk1, . . . , x
k
k) and the optimal solution (x˜
k
1, . . . , x˜
k
k) of instance I under certain ob-
jective function. Accordingly, the competitive ratio CR of the dynamic DRF mechanism
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is defined as
CR = min
I
min
k
The objective value of (xk1, . . . , x
k
k)
The objective value of (x˜k1, . . . , x˜
k
k)
. (4)
3.1 The maxsum objective
When the objective is the sum of dominant shares maximization (maxsum, for short), for
a given instance I, the optimal solution (x˙k1, . . . , x˙
k
k) at step k (≥ 2) in the offline setting
can be obtained by solving the following program


Maximize
k∑
i=1
xki
k∑
i=1
dirx
k
i ≤ k/n, ∀r.
(5)
Accordingly, the competitive ratio CR1 of the dynamic DRF mechanism for the maxsum
objective can be defined as
CR1 = min
I
min
k
∑k
i=1 x
k
i∑k
i=1 x˙
k
i
. (6)
Theorem 1. When the objective is the sum of dominant shares maximization, the
competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism is 1/m, and the ratio is tight.
Proof. Since dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies SI, we have xki ≥ 1/n for every agent
i ≤ k at step k, which implies that
k∑
i=1
xki ≥
k
n
. (7)
Consider the optimal solution (x˙k1, . . . , x˙
k
k) obtained from (5). Clearly, at step k,
∑
i:r∗
i
=r
x˙ki =
∑
i:r∗
i
=r
dir∗
i
x˙ki ≤
k∑
i=1
dirx˙
k
i ≤
k
n
, (8)
for every resource r, following from the fact dir∗
i
= 1 and the capacity constraint of (5).
It implies that
n∑
i=1
x˙ki ≤
m∑
r=1
∑
i:r∗
i
=r
x˙ki ≤
mk
n
, (9)
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where the first inequality follows from the fact that each agent has at least one dominant
resource. Thus, following (7) and (9), we have
∑k
i=1 x
k
i∑n
i=1 x˙
k
i
≥
1
m
, (10)
i.e., the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism is at least 1/m.
Next, we will prove that the competitive ratio is tight. Consider a setting with m
(≥ 2) resources and n (≫ m) agents. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n−m, the demand vector of agent
i is di = (1, 1, . . . , 1). For agents i = n − m + 1, n − m + 2, . . . , n, the demand vectors
are (1, ǫ, . . . , ǫ), (ǫ, 1, . . . , ǫ), · · · , (ǫ, ǫ, . . . , 1), respectively, where ǫ→ 0 is a small enough
number. It is easy to verify that the dynamic DRF mechanism produces a solution with
xni =
1
n−m+ 1 + ǫ(m− 1)
→
1
n−m+ 1
, for each agent i (11)
at step n. The optimal solution will allocate all resources to last the m agents, obtaining
a solution with
x˙ni =
1
1 + ǫ(m− 1)
→ 1, for i = n−m+ 1, n−m+ 2, . . . , n, (12)
and x˙ni = 0 for other agents. Thus, the competitive ratio is
∑k
i=1 x
n
i∑n
i=1 x˙
n
i
→
n
m(n−m+ 1)
=
1
m
1
1−m/n + 1/n
. (13)
When n is large enough, the ratio approaches 1/m. Thus, the theorem holds.
3.2 The maxmin objective
When the objective is minimum dominant share maximization (maxmin, for short), the
optimal solution (x¨k1, . . . , x¨
k
k) at step k (≥ 2) in the offline setting can be obtained by
solving the following program


Maximize min
i
xki
k∑
i=1
dirx
k
i ≤ k/n, ∀r.
(14)
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Actually, (x¨k1, . . . , x¨
k
k) is a DRF solution [2, 5], where the dominant shares of all agents
are equal. Formally, for a given instance I, at every step k, (x¨k1, . . . , x¨
k
k) is obtained by
x¨k1 = · · · = x¨
k
k = min
r
k/n∑k
i=1 dir
, (15)
following from [3, 5].
Therefore, the competitive ratio CR2 of the dynamic DRF mechanism for the maxmin
objective can be defined as
CR2 = min
I
min
k
mini x
k
i
mini x¨
k
i
= min
I
min
k
mini x
k
i
x¨kk
= min
I
min
k
xkk
x¨kk
, (16)
where the last equality follows from the fact mini x
k
i = x
k
k, which can be obtained by
Lemma 2 in [4].
Theorem 2. When the objective is minimum dominant share maximization, the com-
petitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism is 1/m. Moreover, no mechanism satisfying
DPO can do better than 1/(m− 1).
Proof. At every step k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, since the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies the SI
property, we have
xkk ≥
1
n
. (17)
By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a source which is the dominant resource for at
least ⌈k/m⌉ agents. It implies that the DRF solution (x¨k1, . . . , x¨
k
k) satisfies
x¨kk ≤
k/n
⌈k/m⌉
. (18)
Thus, the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism satisfies
CR2 =
xkk
x¨kk
≥
⌈k/m⌉
k
≥
1
m
. (19)
Consider a setting with m (> 2) resources and n = m2+1 agents. For i = 1, 2, . . . , m2,
the demand vector of agent i is defined as
di =


(1, ǫ, . . . , ǫ), if i ≡ 1 (mod m)
(ǫ, 1, . . . , ǫ), if i ≡ 2 (mod m)
· · ·
(ǫ, ǫ, . . . , 1), if i ≡ 0 (mod m)
, (20)
7
where ǫ → 0 is a small enough number. The demand vector of agent n = m2 + 1 is
dn = (1, 1, . . . , 1). At step k = m
2, the dynamic DRF solution is
xki =
m2
[m+ ǫ(m2 −m)](m2 + 1)
→
m
m2 + 1
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, (21)
following from the assumption of ǫ. Actually, after the first m2 steps, at least m2/(m2+1)
share of at least one resource r∗ must be exhausted for any dynamic mechanism satisfying
the DPO property. It implies that at most 1/(m2 + 1) share of resource r∗ is left for the
last agent n. Hence,
xnn ≤
1
m2 + 1
, (22)
for any dynamic mechanism satisfying DPO, while the DRF solution (x¨n1 , . . . , x¨
n
n) satisfies
x¨ni =
1
m+ 1 + ǫ(m2 −m)
→
1
m+ 1
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (23)
It implies that, at step k = n, the competitive ratio of any dynamic mechanism satisfying
DPO including the dynamic DRF mechanism is at most
xnn
x¨nn
→
m+ 1
m2 + 1
≤
1
m− 1
. (24)
Thus, the theorem holds.
4 A linear-time optimal algorithm
Since dynamic DRF is almost optimal as proved in the last section, it is desired to design
an efficient algorithm to find an optimal solution for the dynamic DRF mechanism. Al-
though the water-filling algorithm can produce a dynamic DRF solution [4], the running
time is pseudo-polynomial [3]. Also, we can compute a dynamic DRF solution by solving
the linear program (1). However, it is not a strongly polynomial-time algorithm. In this
section, we will design a linear-time algorithm to find a dynamic DRF solution. In the
proof below, Mk and xki refer to the optimal solution of (1) in step k. The following two
lemmas in [4] are very useful for designing the faster algorithm.
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Lemma 1. At any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that xki = max{M
k, xk−1i } for all agents
i ≤ k.
Lemma 2. At any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all agents i, j such that i < j, it holds that
xki ≥ x
k
j .
Theorem 3. At any step k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, a dynamic DRF solution can be found within
O(k) time.
Proof. Consider an agent j. By Lemma 1, we have xkj = max{M
k, xk−1j }. If x
k
j = x
k−1
j >
Mk, by Lemma 2, for all agents i ≤ j, we have xk−1i ≥ x
k−1
j > M
k, which implies that
xki = max{M
k, xk−1i } = x
k−1
i . If x
k
j = M
k > xk−1j , by Lemma 2, for all agents i ≥ j, we
have xk−1i ≤ x
k−1
j < M
k, which implies that xki = max{M
k, xk−1i } = M
k. Therefore, at
any step k ≥ 2, there is an agent τ ≤ k such that


xki = x
k−1
i > M
k, for i < τ ;
xki = M
k ≥ xk−1i , for τ ≤ i ≤ k.
(25)
Thus, if we know τ , Mk can be obtained by solving the following linear program


Maximize Mk
∑
i:τ≤i≤k
dirM
k +
∑
i:i<τ
dirx
k−1
i ≤
k
n
, for r = 1, 2, . . . , m.
As pointed in [5], this linear program can be rewritten as
Mk = min
r
k/n−
∑
i:i<τ dirx
k−1
i∑
i:τ≤i≤k dir
.
We are now ready to describe our linear-time algorithm. Our main idea is to find τ
by using a bisection method. At any step k ≥ 2, consider the agent l = ⌈(1 + k)/2⌉. Let


x˜ki = x
k−1
i , for i < l;
x˜ki = x
k−1
l , for l ≤ i ≤ k,
(26)
For convenience, let


αr =
∑
i:i<l
dirx
k−1
i , ∀r;
βr =
∑
i:l≤i≤k
dir, ∀r.
(27)
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Clearly, if αr + x
k−1
l βr ≤ k/n for every resource r, i.e., (x˜
k
1, . . . , x˜
k
k) satisfies the capacity
constraints in (1), we have Mk ≥ xk−1l and l ≥ τ . Otherwise, we have M
k < xk−1l and
l < τ . We distinguish the following two cases:
Case 1. l ≥ τ . For every agent i satisfying l ≤ i ≤ k, we have xki = M
k, as i ≥ l ≥ τ .
Let AI = {i : l ≤ i ≤ k} be set of known agents with identical dominant share in the
optimal solution (xk1, . . . , x
k
k). Next, consider the agent ⌈(1 + l)/2⌉ as before.
Case 2. l < τ . For every agent i satisfying i < l, we have xki = x
k−1
i , as i < l < τ .
Let AS = {i : i < l} be set of known agents with same dominant share as in step k − 1
in the optimal solution (xk1, . . . , x
k
k). Next, consider the agent ⌈(l + k)/2⌉ as before.
At every step k, the number of unclassified agents in {i : i /∈ AI, i /∈ AS} is reduced
to half. Finally, all the agents are divided into two subsets AI and AS, and we will
find the τ and the optimal solution (xk1, . . . , x
k
k). Clearly, the running time of deciding
whether l ≥ τ at each iteration is linear in the number of unclassified agents. Thus, the
total running time is O(k+k/2+k/22+ · · ·+1) = O(k), where m is seen as a constant.
The complete algorithm is given as Linear-time dynamic DRF algorithm in
Appendix.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have analyzed the competitive ratio of the dynamic DRF mechanism, which shows
that the dynamic DRF mechanism is a nearly optimal mechanism satisfying DPO for the
maxmin objective. We have described a non-trivial polynomial-time algorithm to find a
dynamic DRF allocation, whose running time is linear in the number of present agents at
every step, improving the result in [4].
Note that another fair allocation mechanism, called cautious LP, is proposed in [4].
Cautious LP achieves near optimal maxmin value at the last step. However, since cautious
LP violates the DPO property and allocates too many resources at the last several steps,
it is unfair to compare cautious LP with dynamic DRF for the maxmin objective. It is
interesting to analyze the competitive ratio of the cautious LP mechanism under different
10
objectives. Since solving the linear program takes too much time, it is challenging to
develop a combinatorial algorithm to find a cautious LP solution as in Section 4.
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Appendix
Linear-time dynamic DRF algorithm
1: Data: Demand di, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
2: Result: Allocation Ak at each step k
3: x11 ← 1/n, A
1
1r ← x
1
1 · d1r, ∀r;
4: k ← 2;
5: while k ≤ n do
6: if
∑k
i=1 dirx
k−1
1 ≤ k/n, ∀r, do
7: αr ← 0, βr ←
∑k
i=1 dir, ∀r;
8: else, do
9: LB ← 1, UB ← k, τ ← ⌈(LB + UB)/2⌉;
10: αr ←
∑τ−1
i=1 dirx
k−1
i , βr ←
∑k
i=τ dir, ∀r;
11: while UB − LB > 1, do
12: if αr + βrx
k−1
τ ≤ k/n, ∀r, do
13: LB ← LB, UB ← τ , τ ← ⌈(LB + UB)/2⌉;
14: αr ← αr −
∑UB−1
i=τ dirx
k−1
i , βr ← βr +
∑UB−1
i=τ dir;
15: else, do
16: LB ← τ , UB ← UB, τ ← ⌈(LB + UB)/2⌉;
17: αr ← αr +
∑τ−1
i=LB dirx
k−1
i , βr ← βr −
∑τ−1
i=LB dir;
18: end if ;
19: end while;
20: end if ;
21: Mk ← minr(k/n− αr)/βr;
22: xki ← max(x
k−1
i ,M
k), ∀i ≤ k;
23: Akir ← x
k
i · dir, ∀i ≤ k;
24: k ← k + 1;
25: end while
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